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Money flows and commodity movements
have to be regarded as fundamental to contem-
porary ecosystems ... because these flows form
a coordinating network that keeps contempo-
rary ecosystems reproducing and changing in
the particular way they do ... And as the flows
shift and change their character, so the creative
impulses embedded in any socio-ecological
system will also shift and change in ways that
may be stressful, contradictory or harmonic as
the case may be. (Harvey 1993: 28)
Many insurance companies have become increas-
ingly concerned about the implications which
global climate change might have for their industry.
By 1995, 'leading insurers from all the world's main
insurance centres had spoken of the threat of bank-
ruptcy from unmanageable catastrophe losses'
(Leggett 1996b: 15). Increasing concern can be
charted from an early report commissioned by the
Reinsurance Offices Association in 1990.
Representatives of Swiss Reinsurance, Munich
Reinsurance (Munich Re) (the world's two largest
reinsurers), some Lloyds' syndicates, and increas-
ingly other insurance companies began to make
significant claims that climate change could bank-
rupt the £1.4 trillion global insurance industry (see
Leggett n.d.: 26-30; Schmidheiny 1992: 64-6;
Schmidheiny and Zorraquin 1996: 121-2).
Their concerns are primarily about increased pay-
outs on large-scale weather-related disasters and
are fuelled by a substantial increase in annual pay-
outs for such events since the mid-1980s, notably
Hurricane Andrew in August 1992, which cost the
global insurance industry $2Obn (Leggett n.d.: 16).
The concern of the insurance industries is that
these kinds of disasters may well increase. Because
of this they have been actively courted by environ-
mental lobbyists, particularly from Greenpeace
(e.g. Leggett 1994; 1996a; 1997).
On the back of this concern, insurance companies
have become increasingly involved in climate
change politics. The first instance of this activity was
a seminar organised for insurers and other financial
sector representatives by Greenpeace at the first
Conference of Parties (COP) to the UN Convention
on Climate Change in Berlin in March 1995. This
was followed by later interventions at climate nego-
tiations (a seminar at the second COP in Geneva in
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July 1996), as well as by the development of a UNEP-
sponsored Statement of Environmental Commitment
by the Insurance Industry (UNEP nd), with follow-
up workshops (UNEP 1997) and, again sponsored
by Greenpeace, the 'Solar Investment Summit' in
Oxford in December 1996, designed to bring
together insurers, bankers and people from the solar
energy industry to stimulate investment in that
industry (Leggett 1997). This last event led to the set-
ting up of the Solar Century, an organisation
intended to promote such investment by insurers.
By early 1999, however, little had moved since the
early developments up to 1996. On the one hand,
the focus on weather-related disasters has contin-
ued. For example, in a report published on 29th
December 1998 by Munich Re, natural disasters
caused 50,000 deaths and damages costing more
than $90 billion in 1998. This was the second high-
est figure ever. Munich Re said this compared with
13,000 deaths and damages of $30 billion in 1997.
Thanks to a combination of global warming and
unusually heavy rain, 1998 was 'a year with an
exceptionally large number of natural catastrophes
Iwhichl claimed the lives of about 50,000 people
throughout the world (Reuters 1999).' The 1998
damage figure was exceeded only by 1995's $180
billion, much of which was caused by the Kobe
earthquake in Japan. Compared with the 1960s, the
past ten years had seen three times as many severe
natural disasters that cost the world's economies,
after adjusting for inflation, nine times as much and
the insurance industry 15 times as much.
On the other hand, the insurance companies have
been rather quiet in political fora concerning cli-
mate change. At the third and fourth Conference of
the Parties to the Climate Change Convention in
Kyoto and Buenos Aires, there were meetings of the
UNEP insurance industry initiative, but no real
development of the position they had adopted, and
little sense that the general position had generated
more concrete plans. It was clear, as emphasised by
Salt (1998), that insurance companies were fairly
politically naïve compared to oil and coal compa-
nies in their dealings with government. It is there-
fore not clear which way the majority of insurance
companies will go. There is some minor evidence of
shifting investment practices, but clearer evidence
that they are trying to make their calculations more
actuarial, for example through funding the
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TSUNAMI initiative, a research programme
designed to calculate risks to insurers under condi-
tions of climate change, and to shift the burdens
onto the insured by raising premiums. They have
only made rather general calls for governments to
limit emissions, without mounting pressure.
Despite the lack of recent movement by insurers
however, many involved in the politics of climate
change remain optimistic that the involvement of
insurance companies may precipitate changes in
political responses to climate change, involving
greater reductions in CO2 emissions than those cur-
rently envisaged. There is a recognition, in policy-
oriented literature (e.g. Flavin and Tunali 1996),
journalistic accounts (e.g. Brown 1996: 185-98)
and academic works (e.g. Ward 1996: 871;
Paterson 1996: 166; Newell and Paterson 1998:
696) of the potential importance of insurance com-
panies as players in climate politics.
I Political Economy, Global
Finance
lt has been fairly commonplace to suggest that cli-
mate-change politics have been to a large extent dri-
ven by the interests of those whose livelihood is
gained by producing and distributing CO2-generat-
ing fossil fuels. The ability of oil and coal compa-
nies, and the oil-exporting states (joined from 1996
by Australia) to make sure that efforts to limit CO2
emissions have been thwarted by and large, is eas-
ily documented. It is argued that this has been pos-
sible because of the (widespread understanding of
a) structural relationship between energy use. and
economic growth (Newell and Paterson 1998).
Such arguments are couched in a political-economy
framework emphasising the structural role of the
state in promoting capital accumulation. But what
is perhaps odd here is that most people working in
such frameworks would argue that leading fractions
of capital, with the capacity to define the interests of
'capital-in-general', are no longer the heavy indus-
trial sectors of the Fordist era, who have prevailed
so far in climate politics.
Rather, the prevalent argument is that processes
both of globalisation, and of the industrial restruc-
turing commonly known as post-Fordism, have dis-
embedded finance from the 'real' economy, shifting
the balance of power between different sectors of
industry towards finance, as well as enhancing the
power of financial markets and institutions over
manufacturing capital. Cerny (1990) uses the term
'competition state' to describe this shift, whereby
states are now seen as channels for investment,
competing with each other to attract investment
within a global economy, rather than as managers of
a primarily national economic development
process. Others, however suggest that this argu-
ment about the declining powers of states in rela-
tion to global finance is misplaced or
overemphasised (e.g. Hirst and Thompson 1996;
1-lelleiner 1994; Martin 1994; Watson 1999).
Interestingly, however, insurance is not itself dis-
cussed to any great extent in such debates (Strange
1996). The general focus of the debates about
global finance is on foreign exchange markets and
the emergence of a range of derivative financial
instruments. This is largely because this is the maj or
means of assessing relations between states and
global finance. But it is an odd neglect, given the
role which insurance plays in industrial investment
and finance, and hence in more general processes of
(global) capital accumulation. By the 1980s insur-
ance companies and pension funds were becoming
dominant in finance (where banks had been in ear-
lier periods) (Leyshon and Thrift 1997: 121-2), and
thus were becoming important even in foreign
exchange markets, where the rapid growth in those
markets was produced in part by deregulation, but
also by the rapid growth in institutional investors'
funds (Martin 1994: 259).
The insurance industry is itself an industry worth
$1.4 trillion globally. The following are some exam-
ples taken primarily from the UK for illustrative
purposes. Institutional investors, comprising insur-
mce companies, pension funds and unit trusts,
comprise 58.5% of all share ownership on the UK
stock market (CSO 1995: 7), with insurance com-
panies accounting for 21,9% and pension funds
27.8%. Insurance investment has grown less fast
than that by pension funds, but still has more than
doubled its proportion of all shares owned since
1963 (ibid.: 8). Industrial investment is also impor-
ant to insurance companies. 50.4% of life assur-
mce company investment is in ordinary stocks and
shares. The figure for general insurance is 19.8%
ABI nd.; Howells and Bain 1994). General insur-
tnce requires greater liquidity than does life, due to
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its more variable payouts and need to make
allowances for extreme events (Clayton and Osborn
1965: 83). But approximately 80% of insurance
company investment comes from life funds, so in
terms of industrial investment the figure for life
company investment is more important.
Such debates, therefore, offer some support for the
optimism of observers of climate politics concern-
ing the impact insurance companies might have on
climate negotiations. But such optimism depends
on two arguments: the strategies insurers will
adopt, which are not yet clear; and the complexities
surrounding their capacity to exercise the power
which the above analysis implies they have, in rela-
tion either to states andlor to manufacturing capital,
in order to effects shifts in CO2 emissions.
2 Insurance Company Strategies
The potential importance of insurers depends on
which of three strategies they decide to adopt (the
threefold typology is drawn from Leggett n.d.). The
first such strategy is the status quo, where insurers
hope that the rise of large-scale losses from storms
and other weather-related disasters is temporary.
The second involves overhauling the way insurance
operates in order to reduce its exposure to such
large-scale risks. Leggett terms the third strategy
'active strategic protection of the market in which it
operates' (nd.: 4). This involves on the one hand
lobbying governments to act to reduce CO2 emis-
sions, and on the other hand the 'strategic deploy-
ment of investment capital' (ibid.: 5), shifting
investment away from fossil fuels and towards non-
carbon based energy sources.
Few companies are now engaged only in the first of
these. Many have gone for the second. They have
done this partly by increasing premiums, partly by
trying to remove cover from certain areas. In
Florida, premiums were up by 72% between 1992
and 1996 after Hurricane Andrew (and doubled in
the Miami area). In Hawaii, after Cyclone Iniki, one
insurance company stopped offering residential
cover. There are various problems with this second
strategy First, if data ceases to be actuarial, calcula-
tions concerning premiums 'will be very difficult to
get right and the overall risks will still increase.
Second, often insurers are regulated so that they
cannot withdraw cover, and the premiums are also
regulated. Third, and perhaps ultimately most
important, the strategy is self-defeating in the long
term. Insurers make their money by insuring peo-
pie and property, and if they progressively reduce
cover, they progressively reduce their potential
sources of income.
For environmentalists such as Leggett, who have
been trying to persuade insurers to take climate
change seriously, the third strategy is the most
attractive one. However, the strategy of shifting
investment practice can be broken down further. It
could involve disinvestment from fossil fuel compa-
nies and reinvestment in renewable energy and
energy efficiency There is a debate within the insur-
ance community about the viability of such a pro-
posai, with the majority view sceptical of its
practicability But this involves shifting the balance
of portfolios within existing investments and
actively promoting investment in alternative energy
sources and technologies (e.g. Nutter 1996: 82-90
- Nutter is the President of the Reinsurance
Association of America). It also concerns direct use
of solar energy in company buildings, and in prop-
erty investment, in which insurance companies are
important investors. Solar Century is founded on
the assumption that investments by these compa-
nies in their own building stock would have signif-
icant impact on the market for solar Photovoltaic
(PV) electricity producing economies of scale which
would then improve the competitiveness of PV and
make it commercially viable (Leggett 1997).
A separate argument which has been advanced to
encourage insurers to switch their investment prac-
tices is that if governments do act to limit CO2 emis-
sions, then the profitability and therefore the share
price of fossil fuel companies is likely to be nega-
tively affected. Mark Mansley of financial analysts
Delphi International has argued that institutional
investors need a long-term strategy for investment in
fossil fuels (Mansley 1994). Therefore there may be
a purely market incentive to get out of fossil fuels or
exert pressure within those companies to shift their
strategic planning away from coal and oil.
3 The Complexities of Insurance
Company Action
But how possible is it in practice to effect invest-
ment shifts which would lead both to reduced CO2
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emissions and to indirect pressure on governments
to adopt emissions reductions? There are all sorts of
complexities which affect the possibility of this
occurring in practice. First, this varies with different
types of insurance company investment, of which
three types - equity capital, loan capital and com-
mercial property investment - are particularly
important. The latter of these is, in principle, the
one where insurers have the most immediate lati-
tude for action. In the other areas, some suggest
that such investment switching is not possible (e.g.
Joly 1996: 193-7; Dlugolecki 1996: 170). This
might be either because companies are regulated to
maximise earnings, which impedes their freedom of
action in investment decisions, or because they are
often price-makers, and thus large-scale disinvest-
ment in particular companies would lead the price
to move against them. Other actors in this debate,
however, suggest that significant shifts in invest-
ment are possible (e.g. Lloyds 1995).
The possibility of such shifts depends, apart from
its financial viability, on a number of other factors.
These include: shifts in discursive understandings
by insurers, towards extended notions of 'fiduciary
responsibility' (Joly 1996) for example; improved
development of environmental reporting by compa-
nies to enable effective investment decisions on cli-
mate related criteria; the effect of the distinction
between long-term and general insurance - while
long-term or life assurance has the largest invest-
ment funds, it is general insurance which is most
immediately hit by climate change; the links
between different branches of insurance within the
same companies; the relationships between those
branches of insurance companies dealing with cli-
mate change impacts in terms of payouts on cata-
strophes, and those dealing with investment
management.
In addition, the possibility of such investment
switching depends to a certain degree on actions by
governments. It is not clear that government actors
understand the importance of insurance industry
involvement and the constraints imposed by their
control over large proportions of portfolio invest-
ment. They do not yet seem to regard such involve-
ment as shifting the balance of forces in ways which
make it easier to adopt emissions reductions. Nor
are those government actors dealing with climate
change aware of the regulatory constraints on
insurance companies responding to climate change
coming from other government agencies.
Government regulation plays a role in providing
contexts and constraints for insurance investment
in relation to climate change (the imposition of car-
bon taxes and promotion of renewables in particu-
lar would make such investment switching by
insurance companies more viable (Joly 1996: 197)).
More general regulatory constraints such as limits
on investments going to particular categories or
companies also affect the possibility of investment-
shifting by insurance companies (Dickinson and
Dinenis 1996).
4 Conclusions
To conclude, insurance is an industry which seems
to have some genuine interest in addressing global
warming, for its own business reasons. In debates
about the relationship between business and envi-
ronmental politics, the motivation of business is
often assumed to be in conflict with the achieve-
ment of environmental goals. Responses by busi-
ness to environmental change and
environmentalism are often assumed to be either
'greenwash' (a repackaging of business-as-usual
practices) (Beder 1997) (see Bebe this volume) or
part of a more aggressive 'green backlash' against
the environmental movement and the gains it has
made (Rowell 1996). The underlying assumption is
that the relationship between business and the envi-
ronment occurs at the point at which attempts are
made to regulate the way in which the activities of
business generate environmental change, and thus
focus is on changing business practice. But in this
case, the relationship is rather different. Here, envi-
ronmental change (caused by other business prac-
tices) affects the core activities of the business itself,
and the assumption is therefore not that the busi-
ness being discussed needs to be made to change its
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